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Deep Freeze: Thawing Rate of Development Growth 
Quotas After Zuckerman v. Town of Hadley 
Benjamin Rothmel* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Upon the half decayed veranda of a small frame house that 
stood near the edge of a ravine near the town of Winesburg, 
Ohio, a fat little old man walked nervously up and down. 
Across a long field that had been seeded for clover but that had 
produced only a dense crop of yellow mustard weeds, he could 
see the public highway along which went a wagon filled with 
berry pickers returning from the fields.1  
Bulldozers would one day raze the small frame house and the hollow 
din of traffic would overwhelm the fields of mustard weeds.2 
Towns like Sherwood Anderson’s Winesburg dot the American 
landscape. Although Anderson never mentioned the urbanization of 
his quaint hometown in his collection of short stories, urbanization is 
inevitable.3 Some communities, cognizant of the price of 
 * J.D. (2006), Washington University School of Law. 
 1. SHERWOOD ANDERSON, WINESBURG, OHIO 7 (1919). 
 2. The Boston Globe described a similar history in the town of Hadley: 
 Two hundred years ago, the rich earth that nourished an unusual kind of grain 
transformed this rural town into the broom-making capital of the nation. Last century, 
Hadley was once heralded as the asparagus capital of the world. 
 But in more recent years, the town has also nourished Pizza Hut, Wal-Mart, and 
Target along a busy strip of Route 9. . . . 
 . . . [B]uilding permits increased fivefold during the 1980s. . . . 
Kathleen Burge, Hadley Law on Building Goes to SJC: Measures to Temper Development at 
Issue, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 29, 2004, at B1. 
 3. “Urbanize: to cause (as a rural area) to take on urban characteristics.” WEBSTER’S 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2520 (Philip Babcock Gove ed., Merriam-Webster 
Inc. 1993) (1961). 
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urbanization, combat expansion by enacting controls referred to 
collectively as growth management.4 For nearly thirty years, the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Construction Industry Ass’n v. City of 
Petaluma5 stood for the proposition that growth management in the 
form of rate of development quotas passes constitutional muster.6 
But, on August 24, 2004, a new case emerged. In Zuckerman v. Town 
of Hadley,7 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held the 
town of Hadley’s growth management quota unconstitutional as a 
violation of substantive due process.8 Although factual distinctions 
help explain these divergent decisions,9 the Zuckerman opinion is 
useful in illuminating the differences between state and federal 
courts’ approaches to substantive due process in land use decisions.  
A. Growth Management 
From a heritage of colonization, America has grown to be a nation 
of property owners.10 Centuries ago, settlers swarmed the 
countryside, divided land, formed communities, and planted the seeds 
of urban development.11 After generations of germination, the 
 4. Growth management is “a dynamic process in which governments anticipate and seek 
to accommodate community development in ways that balance competing land use goals and 
coordinate local with regional interests.” DOUGLAS R. PORTER, MANAGING GROWTH IN 
AMERICA’S COMMUNITIES 10 (1997). 
 When growth is slow, many communities adopt regulations aimed at encouraging 
development. Douglas R. Porter, Reinventing Growth Management for the 21st Century, 23 
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 705, 705 (1999). Public actions increase infrastructure 
and promote real estate development. Id. A community typically enacts restrictive growth 
controls only after it has been threatened by impending overcrowding and insufficient public 
services. Id. A sudden aversion to new residents or any unwanted element in a community is 
related to the “Not in My Back Yard” (NIMBY) phenomenon. See DENIS J. BRION, ESSENTIAL 
INDUSTRY AND THE NIMBY PHENOMENON (1991). 
 5. 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975). 
 6. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 10.04, at 426 (4th ed. 1997). 
 7. 813 N.E.2d 843 (Mass. 2004).  
 8. Id. at 849. 
 9. See infra note 165 and accompanying text. 
 10. KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE 
UNITED STATES 53 (1985). “The idea that land ownership was a mark of status, as well as a 
kind of sublime insurance against ill fortune, was brought to the New World as part of the 
cultural baggage of the European settlers.” Id. 
 11. Id. at 54. “The American dream was in large part land.” Id. 
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product of these seeds is now fast overrunning rural America. With 
dreams of property ownership, Americans are hungry for land.12  
The costs of urbanization, however, temper the benefits of 
property ownership. Such costs are varied and substantial.13 Rapid 
urban expansion increases pressure on local governments to provide 
public facilities, such as water and sewer service,14 leads to 
overcrowding in schools, and eliminates the “rural” character of 
communities.15 Moreover, urbanization has far-reaching ecological 
effects.16 The solution to these problems, many argue, is growth 
management. 
 12.  
[N]o amount of urban gentrification or rural revival can obscure the fact that 
suburbanization has been the outstanding residential characteristic of American life. 
The process may slow in the next half-century as rising energy costs encourage higher 
population densities and less sprawl, and as “urban” problems of crime and 
obsolescence become typical of the inevitably aging suburbs. But the national cultural 
preference for privacy, for the detached home on its own plot, will not easily be 
eroded. 
Id. at 304.   
 13. Costs of urbanization include: “traffic congestion, the sacrifice of community 
character, loss of farmland and open space, polluted water and air, deferred costs for building 
and maintaining highways, schools, and public utilities, increases in local property taxes, and 
disputes among the state, counties, and municipalities on land use decisions.” SAMUEL M. 
HAMILL, JR. ET AL., THE GROWTH MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK: A PRIMER FOR CITIZEN AND 
GOVERNMENT PLANNERS 4 (1989). 
 14. For an overview of growth regulation dependent on water infrastructure, see Adam 
Strachan, Note, Concurrency Laws: Water as a Land-Use Regulation, 21 J. LAND RESOURCES 
& ENVTL. L. 435 (2001). 
 15. See, e.g., Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956, 961–62 (1st Cir. 
1972) (upholding a minimum lot size of six acres to maintain town’s rural character); TIMOTHY 
BEATLEY & KRISTY MANNING, THE ECOLOGY OF PLACE: PLANNING FOR ENVIRONMENT, 
ECONOMY AND COMMUNITY 10 (1997) (noting that expansive development encourages 
expensive construction of basic community infrastructure, such as roads and schools).  
 16. Ecologists argue: 
Urbanization, in the traditional view, destroys natural phenomena and processes, 
demanding inputs . . . drawn from elsewhere to replace and augment local resources. 
The inadequate and impaired “carrying capacity” of the urbanized region is offset by 
the plundering of nonurban hinterlands. . . . [The ecological impacts of urbanization] 
extend to surrounding agricultural lands, to distant rivers and their watersheds, to lands 
that provide timber, crops, grazing, water, and recreation, to sources of minerals, to the 
oceans where wastes are dumped, and to the atmosphere, which is increasingly altered 
by greenhouse gases and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCS) that emanate from urban 
sources . . . .  
Washington University Open Scholarship
p375 Rothmel book pages.doc  7/21/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
378 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 20:375 
 
 
 
Growth management arose from a disconnect between zoning and 
planning.17 Although efforts have been made to synchronize zoning 
with the purposes enunciated in land use plans, perfect coordination 
is impossible.18 This disjunction may be attributed in part to the 
institutional organization of local government. While planning is a 
governmental function performed by experts, zoning is left to citizen 
zoning boards, with final authority usually vested in elected 
officials.19 Further, whereas planning professionals project years into 
the future, zoning boards, perhaps pressured by politics, are often 
shorter-sighted.20 As a result, zoning boards often designate land 
selected by planners for a particular use in the future for a different 
use today.21  
In addition, private development and the zoning process occur at 
different rates.22 While zoning decisions are based on the land’s 
physical attributes, property ownership is an integral element of the 
timing of development.23 Because land values will naturally ripen at 
different times, development often occurs in a scattered fashion.24 
Planners and zoning boards cannot anticipate patterns of private 
development, and therefore, cannot control for them.25 These 
THE ECOLOGICAL CITY: PRESERVING AND RESTORING URBAN BIODIVERSITY 11 (Rutherford H. 
Platt et al. eds., 1994). 
 17. JAMES A. CLAPP, GROWTH MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND ISSUES: A REPORT 
PREPARED FOR THE ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT 13 (1975). Zoning is “the 
division of land into districts having different regulations.” EDWARD M. BASSET, ZONING: THE 
LAWS, ADMINISTRATION, AND COURT DECISIONS DURING THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS 9 (1940), 
quoted in DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 193 (4th ed. 1995). The act of planning is active problem solving 
intended to dictate private land use decisions, focusing primarily on future land use. 
MANDELKER, supra, at 19–20.  
 18. MANDELKER, supra note 6, § 10.01, at 421. 
 19. CLAPP, supra note 17, at 13. 
 20. Id. at 14.  
 21. Id. New York’s revitalization of industrial districts serves as an example. See Michael 
Kwartler, Regulating the Good You Can’t Think of, 3 URB. DESIGN INT’L 13 (1998). Market 
forces shifted the planned use to reflect the property’s highest value use. But in the early 1980s, 
New York’s SoHo district was re-zoned from industrial to residential after citizens petitioned 
for the change. Id. 
 22. CLAPP, supra note 17, at 16–17. 
 23. Id. at 16. 
 24. Id. at 17. 
 25. Id. 
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inefficiencies make traditional zoning an ineffective tool for growth 
management.26  
Growth management programs remedy these problems by guiding 
the rate of growth in a community.27 Growth management is a 
“conscious government program intended to influence the rate, 
amount, type, location, and/or quality of future development within a 
local jurisdiction.”28 There are many forms of growth management. 
For example, a community may match zoning with a comprehensive 
plan for growth, control the timing and sequencing of development 
by conditioning building on the provision of public services,29 or 
adopt annual quotas for development.30 Growth management 
provisions can also be enacted locally or regionally. Eleven states 
have enacted state growth management policies that instruct local 
governments to plan with an eye toward the state’s comprehensive 
plan.31 Ultimately, these techniques, local or statewide, have all faced 
legal challenge. 
 26. MANDELKER, supra note 6, § 10.01, at 421. 
 27. Id. 
 28. DAVID R. GODSCHALK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES OF GROWTH MANAGEMENT 
8 (1977).  
 29. See, e.g., Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1972), appeal 
dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972) (upholding a system requiring a designated number of points 
based on availability of public services to issue building permit). 
 30. MANDELKER, supra note 6, § 10.01, at 422.  
 31. Porter, Reinventing Growth Management, supra note 4, at 719–20 n.83. The states 
are: Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island, 
Tennessee, Vermont, and Washington. Id.  
 A discussion of growth management is incomplete without mention of state-wide growth 
controls. At times more effective in theory than practice, state-wide growth management targets 
urban sprawl at a macro-level. Id. at 720–21. Since inception in the early 1970s, comprehensive 
state plans have been difficult to implement and execute due to a failure of communication and 
cooperation between local governments and state planners. Id. Further, local politics often 
obscure a municipality’s well-intentioned adherence to state planning mandates. Id. at 722. 
Local communities must be dedicated to and invested in the success of the state-wide plan. Id at 
721. 
 Florida offers an example of a state plagued by a number of setbacks in state-wide growth 
management. “[M]ost of Florida’s future growth will be accommodated through sprawling, low 
density development on raw land, with jobs and housing moving away from existing urban 
centers, unless decisive action is taken . . . to reverse this trend.” Id. (quoting THE GOVERNOR’S 
TASK FORCE ON URBAN GROWTH PATTERNS, FINAL REPORT 3 (1989)). For more information 
on Florida’s state-wide growth management plan, see Mary Dawson, The Best Laid Plans: The 
Rise and Fall of Growth Management in Florida, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 325 (1996). 
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Growth management gives rise to a number of possible aggrieved 
parties.32 Local residents, whose personal rights might be affected by 
growth management, are typical plaintiffs.33 In addition, developers 
might oppose growth management because construction limits not 
only make construction opportunities rare, but also create an artificial 
scarcity of land.34 Low income citizens, or groups that protect their 
interests, might object to a potential decrease in housing construction, 
increase in housing costs, and subsequent exclusion of the poor from 
communities.35 Finally, neighboring towns, though directly 
uninvolved in growth management, might nevertheless feel its effect. 
Towns adjacent to a growth management community are often forced 
to absorb the excess population and construction created by restricted 
nearby development.36  
Aggrieved parties often challenge growth controls as 
unconstitutional. A plaintiff may claim that a local community’s 
growth management provision violates his or her substantive due 
process right under the United States Constitution. This right is 
protected against federal intrusion by the Fifth Amendment, and is 
protected against state intrusion by the Fourteenth Amendment.37 The 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause reads, “nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.”38 A substantive due process violation exists “if a 
statute or ordinance regulates something beyond the delegated 
powers, is arbitrary or capricious, or is lacking in ascertainable 
 32. GODSCHALK, supra note 28, at 14.  
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 13–14. The town of Hadley has seen a marked increase in property values since 
enacting a growth management scheme. This result is often a double-edged sword. While 
controlling expansion in Hadley, growth management schemes have inflated the price of single-
family homes from a median of $177,000 in 2002, to a median of $230,000 in 2004. Burge, 
supra note 2, at B1. 
 35. GODSCHALK, supra note 28, at 14; see also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 
409, 443–44 (1968) (holding that private persons are forbidden by the Thirteenth Amendment 
from racially discriminating in the sale of houses); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 
F.2d 1179, 1188 (8th Cir. 1974) (invalidating the prohibition of multi-family housing under 
Title VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act); S. Burlington County NAACP v. Twp. of Mount 
Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 734 (N.J. 1975) (Mount Laurel I) (invalidating zoning that excluded low 
and moderate income families), aff’d 456 A.2d 390, 410 (N.J. 1983) (Mount Laurel II). 
 36. GODSCHALK, supra note 28, at 14. 
 37. Id. at 43.  
 38. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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standards or a statement of reasons.”39 Because most state 
constitutions mirror the U.S. Constitution’s Due Process Clause, 
violations of state due process rights follow similar precepts.40 This 
Note focuses on such challenges to annual growth management 
development quotas in the context of Zuckerman v. Town of 
Hadley.41 In examining the differences between Zuckerman and the 
seminal case of Petaluma, this Note aims to illuminate how the 
considerations of a state court differ from those of a federal court in a 
substantive due process challenge.  
Part II of this Note first outlines the classic judicial analysis used 
to review land-use regulations adopted under the police power. Next, 
it offers an example of how courts apply this analysis in growth 
management litigation generally, and in growth management quota 
litigation from Petaluma to Zuckerman more specifically. Part III 
provides an overview of the considerations impacting the Zuckerman 
court, and how the Zuckerman opinion might affect future courts and 
local communities. Part IV offers closing remarks. 
II. HISTORY 
A. Euclid Analysis 
Municipalities can regulate land use under the state’s police 
power, as provided by state enabling legislation, or under state home 
rule provisions.42 The Supreme Court announced the standard for 
judicial review of regulations based on the state’s police power in 
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.43 In deciding Euclid, the 
Supreme Court indicated its reluctance to review the local 
community’s use of the police power in land use actions.44 The task 
of ruling on local use of the police power has therefore fallen on 
 39. GODSCHALK, supra note 28, at 43–44.  
 40. Id. at 43. 
 41. 813 N.E.2d 843 (Mass. 2004). 
 42. GODSCHALK, supra note 28, at 45.  
 43. Euclid, 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926); GODSCHALK, supra note 28, at 45. 
 44. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 397. 
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lower federal courts or state courts.45 Nevertheless, Euclid provides 
the classic analysis to be applied by future courts. 
In Euclid, a landowner challenged an ordinance enacted to 
establish zoning districts, claiming deprivation of liberty and property 
without due process of law.46 The Court indicated a general 
presumption in favor of validity; an ordinance is assumed to be 
within the police power unless rebutted by the plaintiff.47 Moreover, 
the Court exhibited deference to the legislature, noting that questions 
of legislative policy are beyond its purview.48 
To overcome the presumption of a regulation’s validity, a plaintiff 
must surmount a high threshold. It is not enough for a plaintiff to 
prove that another regulation would be more reasonable; instead, a 
plaintiff must prove that the regulation is clearly arbitrary or 
unreasonable.49 Courts, however, vary in their definitions of what 
qualifies as clearly arbitrary or unreasonable.50  
 45. GODSCHALK, supra note 28, at 45. In addition, in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 
395 (1989), the Supreme Court suggested that a plaintiff should not argue a substantive due 
process claim if another constitutional claim is available. This limit has barred many suits in 
federal courts in circuits adopting this rule for land use conflicts. DANIEL R. MANDELKER, 
LAND USE LAW § 2.39, at 2–46 (5th ed. 2003). For a general overview of circuits adopting this 
rule, see id. § 2.40, at 2–47 n.3 (citing S. County Sand & Gravel Co. v. Town of South 
Kingstown, 160 F.3d 834, 838 (1st Cir. 1998); Macri v. King County, 126 F.3d 1125, 1129 (9th 
Cir. 1997); Villas of Lake Jackson v. Leon County, 121 F.3d 610, 615 (11th Cir. 1997); Sinclair 
Oil Corp. v. County of Santa Barbara, 96 F.3d 401, 407 (9th Cir. 1996); Bickerstaff Clay Prods. 
Co. v. Harris County, 89 F.3d 1481, 1490 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding that the substantive due 
process police power limitation is subsumed within the takings clause); Miller v. Campbell 
County, 945 F.2d 348, 352 (10th Cir. 1991) (non-zoning case)). 
 46. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 384.  
 47. GODSCHALK, supra note 28, at 45.  
 48. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388. “If the validity of the legislative classification for zoning 
purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control.” Id. (citing 
Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292, 294 (1924)). The Court further commented that if a 
legislative body deemed a community to have set forth “a sufficient reason for adopting the 
ordinance in question, it is not the province of the courts to take issue with the council. We have 
nothing to do with the question of the wisdom or good policy of municipal ordinances.” Id. at 
393 (quoting State ex rel. Civello v. City of New Orleans, 97 So. 440, 444 (La. 1923)). 
 49. GODSCHALK, supra note 28, at 46. “This burden of proof might be met if, for 
example, it could be shown that the regulation applied only to one parcel of land, had an 
exclusionary purpose, or put exceedingly heavy demands on landowners.” Id.  
 50. Id. Some federal courts require an arbitrary or unreasonable regulation to “‘shock[] the 
conscience’ of the court.” MANDELKER, supra note 45, § 2.39, at 2–46. For an overview of the 
standards used by the circuits see generally id. § 2.39, 2–46 n.5 (citing Natale v. Town of 
Ridgefield, 170 F.3d 258, 259 (2d Cir. 1999) (“outrageously arbitrary so as to constitute a gross 
abuse of governmental authority”); Richardson v. City & County of Honolulu, 124 F.3d 1150 
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Once a plaintiff proves that a municipal regulation is 
unreasonable, the court applies a low threshold rational basis test.51 
This test reflects the court’s continued deference for legislative 
determinations. A rational basis may be demonstrated by proving: 
that the purpose of the regulation is “a legitimate objective of the 
police power,” that the means of the regulation are necessary to 
accomplish the regulation’s end, and that “the means are not unduly 
oppressive upon the individual.”52  
A legitimate end is classically one that relates to the health, safety 
or general welfare of a community.53 The regulation’s means are 
valid if they are tailored to fit the regulation’s end, and exhibit a 
reasonable relation.54 However, even if a court finds that a 
regulation’s means and ends are valid, it may nevertheless deem a 
regulation unconstitutional if it is unduly oppressive to the 
individual.55 In Euclid, the Court held that zoning practices separating 
commercial and residential districts reasonably serve the goals of 
furthering the public health and safety of a community, and are, 
therefore, constitutional.56 
B. Euclid Analysis Applied 
Golden v. Planning Board of Ramapo 57 a leading case upholding 
growth management, represents an application of the Euclid analysis 
(9th Cir. 1997) (arbitrary and irrational); DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 53 F.3d 592 
(3d Cir. 1995); Chesterfield Dev. Corp. v. City of Chesterfield, 963 F.2d 1102 (8th Cir. 1992) 
(something more than arbitrary and capricious); Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211 
(6th Cir. 1992) (reviewing standards applied in the federal circuits); Spence v. Zimmerman, 873 
F.2d 256 (11th Cir. 1989) (pretextual, arbitrary and capricious, and without rational basis)). 
 51. GODSCHALK, supra note 28, at 46.  
 52. Id.  
 53. Id. at 46–47. 
 54. Id. at 47; see, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934). The court will not 
impose its own judgment; “wisdom and propriety” are matters left to legislative bodies. S.C. 
State Highway Dep’t. v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 190–91 (1938). 
 55. GODSCHALK, supra note 28, at 48. This is a rare occurrence reserved for particularly 
egregious local actions. Id.  
 56. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 396–97 (1926). “[S]egregation 
of industries, commercial pursuits and dwellings to particular districts in a city, when exercised 
reasonably, may bear a rational relation to the health, morals, safety and general welfare of the 
community.” Id. at 392 (quoting City of Aurora v. Burns, 149 N.E.2d 784, 788 (Ill. 1925)). 
 57. 285 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972). 
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in growth control litigation. The town of Ramapo is located in 
Rockland County near the Hudson River in New York.58 Originally 
one of many rural communities dotting the New York countryside, 
Ramapo is now a twenty-five minute commute from New York City, 
thanks to the construction of the Tappan Zee bridge in 1955.59 During 
the early 1950s and 60s, the town’s population grew considerably.60 
Because it struggled to provide increased municipal services to its 
growing population, Ramapo developed a master plan.61 In doing so, 
it conducted a study of “existing land uses, public facilities, 
transportation, industry and commerce, housing needs and projected 
population trends.”62 Following the adoption of a comprehensive 
plan, Ramapo adopted two capital improvement plans that forecasted 
the location and sequence of capital improvements for a total period 
of eighteen years.63 Ramapo later adopted a series of zoning 
amendments intended to prevent premature subdivision and urban 
sprawl.64 The court noted that “[r]esidential development is to 
proceed according to the provision of adequate municipal facilities 
and services, with the assurance that any concomitant restraint upon 
property use is to be of a ‘temporary’ nature and that other private 
uses, including the construction of individual housing, are 
authorized.”65 
Ramapo’s zoning amendment created a new zoning category 
designated for “Residential Development Use.”66 However, a 
developer had to acquire a special permit before he or she could build 
 58. CLAPP, supra note 17, at 37. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d at 294 n.1. Ramapo’s population ballooned a towering 130.8% 
in unincorporated areas. Id.  
 61. Id. at 294. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 295. “The two plans, covering a period of 18 years, detail the capital 
improvements projected for maximum development and conform to the specifications set forth 
in the master plan . . . .” Id.  
 64. Id. “The undisputed effect of these integrated efforts in land use planning and 
development is to provide an over-all program of orderly growth and adequate facilities through 
a sequential development policy commensurate with progressing availability and capacity of 
public facilities.” Id. at 296.  
 65. Id. at 295.  
 66. Id. The concept of “‘Residential Development Use’ is defined as ‘The erection or 
construction of dwellings or any vacant plots, lots or parcels of land.’” Id.  
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for such a use.67 Permit allocation depended on the presence of “five 
essential facilities or services: . . . (1) public sanitary sewers or 
approved substitutes; (2) drainage facilities; (3) improved public 
parks or recreation facilities, including public schools; (4) State, 
county or town roads—major, secondary or collector; and, (5) 
firehouses.”68 Ramapo awarded permits only to proposed 
developments scoring high enough on each of these factors to attain a 
total score of fifteen points or more.69 Thus, permit award depended 
on the availability of municipal improvements for a prospective 
plat.70  
The zoning amendment further outlined remedial provisions under 
which the board could issue “special permits vesting a present right 
to proceed with residential development in such year as the 
development meets the required point minimum, but in no event later 
than the final year of the 18-year capital plan.”71 In addition, a 
developer could expedite permit approval by supplying his or her 
own capital improvements to raise the development points of the plat 
to the required number.72  
Golden, who sought plat approval but was denied because he 
failed to apply for the requisite special permit, brought suit 
challenging the facial validity of Ramapo’s zoning amendment.73 The 
court recognized that while Ramapo’s goals were praiseworthy, there 
were questions regarding the suitability of the means used to achieve 
the desired end.74 
The Ramapo court considered whether the town possessed the 
legislative delegation to enact its zoning amendment, and, citing 
Euclid, held that it did.75 “[T]he matrix of land use restrictions, 
common to each of the enumerated powers and sanctioned goals, [is] 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 296. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 294. 
 74. Id. at 296. 
 75. Id. at 297 (citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 389–90 
(1926)). 
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a necessary concomitant to the municipalities’ recognized authority 
to determine the lines along which local development shall proceed, 
though it may divert it from its natural course . . . .”76 Further, the 
court followed Euclid by stating that the distinction between a 
permissible and impermissible restriction depends upon the 
restriction’s purpose and its impact on the community and the public 
interest.77 In its analysis, the court also noted its deference to the 
legislature.78 
Ultimately, the Ramapo court held that there was a rational basis 
for Ramapo’s zoning amendment.79 The purpose of Ramapo’s zoning 
amendment was not exclusion, but rather timed growth through 
which a balanced community using land efficiently could thrive.80 
Moreover, the court acknowledged that Ramapo’s zoning amendment 
was reasonably intended to prevent the transformation of a successful 
community into a blighted ghetto.81 Because Ramapo’s existing 
resources were inadequate to furnish essential services and facilities, 
as required by Ramapo’s substantial population increase, the court 
held that there was a rational basis for Ramapo’s zoning 
amendment.82  
 76. Id.  
 77. Id. at 302.  
 78. Id. at 301. “Implicit in such a philosophy of judicial self-restraint is the growing 
awareness that matters of land use and development are peculiarly within the expertise of 
students of city and suburban planning, and thus well within the legislative prerogative . . . .” 
Id.  
 79. Id. at 304–05.  
[W]here it is clear that the existing physical and financial resources of the community 
are inadequate to furnish the essential services and facilities which a substantial 
increase in population requires, there is a rational basis for ‘phased growth’ and hence, 
the challenged ordinance is not violative of the Federal and State Constitutions.  
Id. 
 80. Id. at 302. “[T]he present amendments merely seek, by the implementation of 
sequential development and timed growth, to provide a balanced cohesive community dedicated 
to the efficient utilization of land.” Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 304–05. It is important to note that an integral factor of the Ramapo decision 
was Ramapo’s extensive planning prior to adopting its zoning amendment; this enabled the 
court to easily find a rational basis. Id. at 303. 
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C. Euclid Analysis in Quota Litigation 
While Ramapo is a leading case upholding the constitutionality of 
growth management generally, Construction Industry Ass’n of 
Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma83 is a leading case upholding the 
constitutionality of quotas specifically as a tool for growth 
management. The city of Petaluma is located in Sonoma County, 
California, forty miles north of San Francisco.84 Over time, the Bay 
area housing market expanded to include Petaluma as drivers became 
more willing to commute longer distances.85 Once it became part of 
the Bay area, Petaluma experienced growth estimated at almost 
twenty-five percent over two years and a sizeable increase in housing 
construction.86  
In response, Petaluma temporarily froze development in 1971 to 
give the City Council and planners an opportunity to evaluate the 
situation and develop appropriate short- and long-term strategies.87 
The city subsequently enacted the “Petaluma Plan” to remedy the 
effects of population growth.88 The Petaluma Plan applied only to 
housing units that were located in developments of five or more 
units.89 The plan called for an annual development quota of 500 
dwelling units per year, and purported to last five years.90 Further, a 
 83. 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975). 
 84. Id. at 900. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. From 1964 to 1971, the number of completed housing units were: 1964—270; 
1965—440; 1966—321; 1967—234; 1968—379; 1969—358; 1970—581; and 1971—891. Id. 
 87. Id. The Council made the following findings:  
[F]rom 1960–1970 housing had been in almost unvarying 6000 square-foot lots laid 
out in regular grid patterns; . . . there was a density of approximately 4.5 housing units 
per acre in the single-family home areas; . . . during 1960–1970, 88 per cent of housing 
permits issued were for single-family detached homes; . . . in 1970, 83 per cent of 
Petaluma’s housing was single-family dwellings; . . . the bulk of recent development 
(largely single-family homes) occurred in the eastern portion of the City, causing a 
large deficiency in moderately priced multi-family and apartment units on the east 
side. 
Id. 
 88. Id. at 901. 
 89. Id. The plan did not affect single-family residential homes.  
 90. Id. 
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“greenbelt” was placed around Petaluma, constricting urban growth 
to within the designated area.91  
In addition, the Petaluma Plan contained a point system similar to 
the Ramapo system.92 The Residential Development Control System 
provided criteria for the award of the 500 total yearly permits.93 As in 
Ramapo, point allocation was complex. Builders could obtain points 
by complying with Petaluma’s comprehensive and environmental 
plans, by exhibiting good architecture, and by providing low income 
housing.94 Also, permits were to be divided between the eastern and 
western portions of the city, with a percentage of the annual quota 
designated for low- and moderate-income housing.95  
Petaluma’s goal in enacting its growth management plan was to 
ensure its rural nature.96 At trial, the district court evaluated the 
anticipated effect of the plan. Experts testified that if the plan were 
adopted, there would be a substantial impact on the housing market.97 
Under the plan, the region surrounding Petaluma would likely 
experience a housing shortage, an effect that would be felt most 
acutely by low-income families requiring multi-family dwellings.98 
However, with regard only to Petaluma, there was no evidence that 
adoption of the plan would deteriorate the quality or choice of 
housing for low-income families.99  
Two landowners and the Construction Industry Association of 
Sonoma County filed suit claiming that the Petaluma Plan was 
unconstitutional because it was arbitrary and therefore a violation of 
their substantive due process rights.100 In reviewing the plan, the 
Petaluma court noted that even though a lower court had found that 
 91. Id. But, in a footnote, the court commented that the district court had found that 
Petaluma made official attempts to continue the plan past the five year mark. Id. n.1. 
 92. 285 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972). 
 93. Petaluma, 522 F.2d at 901.  
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 901–02. The stated purpose of the Petaluma plan was to “protect [Petaluma’s] 
small town character and surrounding open space” and to ensure that development occurred in 
an orderly fashion. Id. 
 97. Id. at 902. 
 98. Id. “For the decade 1970 to 1980, the shortfall in needed housing in the region would 
be about 105,000 units (or 25 per cent of the units needed).” Id.  
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 905. 
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the plan had an exclusionary purpose, this was not the end of the 
examination.101 The court announced that it needed to go further by 
engaging in rational basis analysis.102  
First, the court evaluated whether the purpose of the Petaluma 
Plan fell within the police power.103 Recognizing the inclusive nature 
of the police power, the court noted that it should be interpreted 
broadly.104 In determining whether Petaluma’s interest in preserving 
its town character and avoiding growth fell within the definition of 
public welfare, the court examined Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas105 
and Ybarra v. City of Los Altos Hills,106 two earlier cases in which the 
court upheld more restrictive zoning regulations. 
At issue in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas was a zoning 
ordinance limiting the occupancy of single family dwellings to 
traditional families or groups of not more than two unrelated 
persons.107 Further, Belle Terre’s ordinance prohibited the 
construction or conversion of any structure for any use other than a 
single family home, thereby slowing growth.108 The owners of a 
boarding house occupied by six unrelated college students, who had 
been cited for violating the ordinance, brought suit asserting that the 
ordinance was unconstitutional.109 The Supreme Court, following 
Euclid, held the ordinance valid, commenting that the expansive 
police power can be used to promote quiet enjoyment, as well as to 
prevent public harm.110 Even the dissent recognized the breadth of the 
local government’s police power.111 
 101. Id. at 906. 
 102. Id. “[I]n reviewing the reasonableness of a zoning ordinance, our inquiry does not 
terminate with a finding that it is for an exclusionary purpose. We must determine further 
whether the exclusion bears any rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.” Id. (footnote 
omitted). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. The police power should not be limited to the “regulation of noxious activities or 
dangerous structures.” Id.  
 105. 416 U.S. 1 (1974). 
 106. 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974).  
 107. Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 2. The ordinance defined a family as one or more persons 
related by blood, adoption or marriage living as a single unit. Id. Two people living together, 
though not related by blood, were also deemed a family. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 2–3. 
 110. Id. at 8–9. The police power is “ample to lay out zones where family values, youth 
values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.” 
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At issue in Ybarra v. City of Los Altos Hills112 was a zoning 
ordinance establishing a minimum residential lot size of one acre and 
a maximum occupancy of one dwelling unit per lot, effectively 
controlling population and preventing low-income individuals from 
living within the city.113 An unincorporated association of Mexican-
Americans challenged the constitutionality of this ordinance, alleging 
a violation of equal protection.114 Following the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Belle Terre, the Ninth Circuit held that the Ybarra 
ordinance bore a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental 
interest of maintaining the community’s pastoral character.115 
Relying on Belle Terre and Ybarra, the Petaluma court held that 
the Petaluma Plan was not arbitrary or unreasonable.116 The fact that 
the Petaluma Plan functioned to Petaluma’s advantage did not 
remove it from the police power.117 Further, the definition of public 
welfare, announced in Belle Terre and Ybarra, was sufficiently broad 
to encompass Petaluma’s desire to protect its rural character, limit 
population density, and ensure slow, orderly growth.118  
In addition, the court gave deference to the legislature.119 Because 
the Petaluma Plan was not unconstitutional, the court stressed that the 
forum by which residents should seek recourse was the legislature.120 
As the legislature represents the public, it is in the legislature’s 
Id. at 9. 
 111. In his dissent, Justice Marshall identified the expansive nature of the police power, 
noting that “[t]he police power which provides the justification for zoning is not narrowly 
confined. And, it is appropriate that we afford zoning authorities considerable latitude in 
choosing the means by which to implement such purposes.” Id. at 13–14 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (citation omitted).  
 112. 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974).  
 113. Id. at 252.  
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 254 (holding the regulation “rationally related to preserving the town’s rural 
environment,” a legitimate goal within the police power); see also Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town 
of Sanbornton, 392 F. Supp. 1144, 1152 (D.N.H. 1974) (considering all factors regarding the 
reasonableness of an ordinance). 
 116. 522 F.2d 897, 908 (9th Cir. 1975). 
 117. Id. “[T]he due process rights of builders and landowners are [not necessarily] violated 
merely because a local entity exercises in its own self-interest the police power lawfully 
delegated to it by the state.” Id.  
 118. Id. at 908–09. 
 119. Id. at 908. 
 120. Id. 
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domain to adjust a system to best serve the general welfare of a 
region.121  
Once the court held that the Petaluma Plan’s objective was within 
the police power, the court further determined that a rational 
relationship existed between the means employed and Petaluma’s 
desired end of rural preservation.122 The Petaluma Plan was, 
therefore, constitutional. 
D. The Rise of Zuckerman 
Federal courts and the Supreme court have given great deference 
to legislative determinations in deciding whether a land use 
regulation is constitutional. A federal court’s distance from the 
controversy and from the decision-making itself underscores the need 
for such deference. State courts, less removed, often understandably 
give less deference to legislatures. Zuckerman v. Town of Hadley,123 a 
recent decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 
demonstrates this phenomenon.  
Idyllic in nature, pastoral and quaint, Hadley, Massachusetts, 
typifies small-town America.124 In 1988, experiencing a sudden 
influx of population, the town enacted a rate of development 
amendment to its zoning bylaws to control future growth.125 The 
avowed purpose of this amendment was twofold: to maintain 
 121. Id. “[T]he federal court is not a super zoning board and should not be called on to 
mark the point at which legitimate local interests in promoting the welfare of the community are 
outweighed by legitimate regional interests.” Id. 
 122. Id.  
 123. 813 N.E.2d 843 (Mass. 2004). 
 124. The town of Hadley is characterized by “countless relics of the past, from colonial 
houses and cemeteries to museums containing artifacts from days gone by.” Town of Hadley, 
Massachusetts, http://www.hadleyma.org/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2006). Urbanization is 
transforming the town.  
 Hadley, with about 4,700 residents, is a town with two faces. The busy stretch along 
Route 9, from Interstate 91 to the Amherst border, is packed with retail and restaurant 
chains. But another section of town, resting beneath the ragged Holyoke Range, is a 
world away, sparsely populated and rural. 
Burge, supra note 2, at B1. Hadley’s rapid growth in the 1980s created this split personality. 
For example, in 1980, the town issued an average of ten building permits annually. Id. In 1987, 
the town issued fifty permits. Id. Further, in 1987, a developer unveiled plans for a residential 
subdivision of 255 homes, the largest development ever proposed in Hadley. Id.  
 125. Zuckerman, 813 N.E.2d at 845. 
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Hadley’s small-town character and to enable the organized provision 
of public services in the future.126 The town of Hadley was “dedicated 
to keep[ing its] distinction as the most agricultural community in the 
Commonwealth.”127 
Hadley’s rate of growth amendment restricted the number of 
building permits to be issued each year for the development of lots 
held in common ownership.128 The amendment required development 
to be spread over a period of up to ten years, in effect instituting a 
quota system.129 Though controversial, the bylaw amendment 
represented only the last step in a lengthy process in Hadley of 
dealing with growth.130 Prior to adopting its zoning amendment, 
Hadley had engaged in a number of studies to determine how best to 
enact growth management in the future.131 However, with no shortage 
of research and recommendations, Hadley repeatedly failed to adopt 
many of the solutions suggested by prior studies, opting instead for 
its bylaw amendment.132  
 126. Id. Hadley described the purpose of its rate of growth bylaw as “preserving the town’s 
agricultural land and character, and providing for a ‘phasing-in’ of population growth, thereby 
allowing time for the town to plan and to expand its public services.” Id.  
 127. Id. at 846 n.3. 
 128. Id. at 845. 
 129. Id.  
 The relevant portions of the rate of development amendment . . . provide: 
 “15.0.1. Building permits for the construction of dwellings on lots held in common 
ownership on the effective date of this provision shall not be granted at a rate per 
annum greater than as permitted by the following schedule . . . . 
 “15.1.1. For such lots containing a total area of land sufficient to provide more than 
ten dwellings at the maximum density permitted for the District in which such lots are 
located: one tenth of the number of dwellings permitted to be constructed or placed on 
said area of land based on said maximum permitted density. 
 “15.2.1. For such lots containing a total area of land insufficient to provide more 
than ten dwellings at the maximum density permitted under these Bylaws for the 
District in which such lots are located: one dwelling.” 
Id. at 845 n.2. 
 130. Id. at 846. 
 131. Id. These studies recommended adopting a comprehensive plan, reorganizing the 
town’s planning process, modifying waterfront zoning, enhancing flood protection, providing 
incentives for protecting farmland, and limiting water and sewer expansion, among other 
recommendations. Id. at 846 n.7.  
 132. Id. at 846–47. “[Hadley] has not prepared or adopted a comprehensive land use plan 
or a community open space bylaw . . .; it has not effected a major overhaul of its zoning bylaws 
. . .; it has not adopted a cluster development bylaw . . ., increased minimum lot sizes in 
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Martha Zuckerman, a thoroughbred horse farm owner with an 
approximately sixty-six acre parcel of land in Hadley, claimed that 
the rate of development amendment was unconstitutional.133 
Reaching the age of retirement and no longer able to care for her 
farm, Zuckerman wished to sell her property so that it could be 
subdivided for development.134 However, as a result of the town’s 
bylaw amendment, Zuckerman’s property, which could accommodate 
a subdivision of forty single-family homes, could not be developed at 
once.135 Instead, it could only be developed at a rate of four units per 
year over ten years, making it an unattractive investment for 
developers.136 The lower court, relying on an earlier holding in 
Sturges v. Town of Chilmark,137 held the amendment 
unconstitutional.138 
At issue in Sturges v. Town of Chilmark was Chilmark’s growth 
control ordinance, which was similar to that of Hadley in that it 
controlled residential rate of development by restricting yearly 
construction.139 Articulating the Euclid analysis, the court evaluated 
the purpose of Chilmark’s growth controls.140 Chilmark, a town in 
Martha’s Vineyard, asserted that its growth control was justified by 
government studies relating to soil limitations for septic tank 
agricultural districts . . ., or hired a full-time planner . . . .” Id. at 847. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id.; see also Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Strikes down “Rate of 
Development” Bylaw, LAND USE & REAL ESTATE LAW CLIENT ALERT (Davis Malm & 
D’Agostine P.C., Boston, Mass.), Sept. 2004, at 1, available at http://www.davismalm.com/ 
DavisMalm/publications/RealEstateClientAlertSeptember2004.pdf [hereinafter “Rate of 
Development” Bylaw]. 
 135. Zuckerman, 813 N.E.2d at 847. 
 136. Id. at 847 n.10. 
Zuckerman stated that three developers informed her that, as a result of the bylaw, it 
was “not economically feasible” to develop the property, largely because the bylaw 
reduces the developers’ flexibility and makes unavailable the economic advantages of 
large-scale development, thereby increasing the cost of development and reducing the 
marketability of the land. 
Id. 
 137. 402 N.E.2d 1346 (Mass. 1980). 
 138. Zuckerman, 813 N.E.2d at 847. 
 139. Chilmark, 402 N.E.2d at 1349. The Chilmark bylaw limited “the issuance of building 
permits for residential construction to one tenth of the lots in a ‘subdivision’ in the year the lots 
are subdivided and a further one tenth of those lots in each of the subsequent nine years.” Id.  
 140. Id. at 1352–53. 
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sewerage disposal and potential water contamination.141 Noting the 
safety concerns at issue and the special nature of Martha’s Vineyard 
as a region,142 the Sturges court held that for a growth control to be 
constitutional, it must be a temporary measure intended to slow 
growth during the implementation of a comprehensive plan.143  
In a footnote, the court noted that Chilmark had actively taken 
steps to alleviate the need for growth control, stating that “[a] very 
different case would be presented if it were determined that the town 
was not proceeding with the necessary studies which are said to be 
the basis for the enactment of the rate of development by-law.”144 
Zuckerman is this different case. In Zuckerman, the lower court found 
not only that Hadley’s zoning amendment was not temporary, but 
also that the town failed to develop a working comprehensive plan, or 
even to implement the recommendations of its numerous 
development studies.145 The town of Hadley appealed the lower 
court’s ruling to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.146  
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts evaluated the case 
under Euclid, considering whether the zoning bylaw violated due 
process because it was arbitrary and unreasonable with no substantial 
 141. Id. at 1353. 
 142. Id. at 1352. 
 143. Id. at 1350. “We hold that a municipality may impose reasonable time limitations on 
development, at least where those restrictions are temporary and adopted to provide controlled 
development while the municipality engages in comprehensive planning studies.” Id.  
 144. Id. at 1354 n.16. 
 145. 813 N.E.2d 843, 847 (Mass. 2004). The town of Hadley argued that its growth 
management amendment should stand so long as the potential dangers of growth remained. Id. 
at 848–49. The Zuckerman court succinctly summarized Hadley’s position: 
[T]he town argues that the pressures of growth justifying the ROD [rate of 
development] amendment in Hadley are indefinite in duration and substantial in their 
potential effect on the town’s finances and character, and that the unlimited duration of 
the ROD amendment is therefore consistent with the purposes that motivated it. In 
essence, the town contends that, so long as the ROD amendment continues to limit 
growth over time, creating the buffer that the town considers necessary to absorb an 
increasing population while continuing to preserve those characteristics and to provide 
those public facilities that make Hadley a desirable place to live, the amendment is in 
the public interest and advances legitimate zoning purposes, and thus passes 
constitutional muster. 
Id. The court then rejected this argument. Id. at 849. 
 146. Id. at 847. 
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relation to general welfare.147 In this determination, the court focused 
on Hadley’s inaction. Although its growth management amendment 
had been in place for fifteen years,148 the town had taken little, if any, 
action to remedy potential difficulties in the provision of public 
services caused by increased population.149 The court held that 
unlimited growth controls adopted for a reason other than to assist in 
the execution of a comprehensive plan are inherently opposite to the 
public welfare.150 Further, the court indicated that this sort of growth 
management not only harms the town itself, but also the neighboring 
communities because it shifts population from Hadley to other 
towns.151 The Hadley court ultimately held that unless growth must 
be inhibited temporarily to foster resource and infrastructure 
development, as determined on a case-by-case basis, ordinances such 
as Hadley’s do not serve a public purpose, and are consequently 
unconstitutional.152 
III. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts’ holding in 
Zuckerman v. Town of Hadley153 represents a change for the better in 
growth management quota litigation. Zuckerman represents the far 
end of a spectrum built over years of litigation. In Village of Euclid v. 
Ambler Realty Co.,154 the Supreme Court provided the analytical 
structure by which courts evaluate constitutional challenges to land 
 147. Id. at 848 (citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926)). 
 148. Id. at 846. 
 149. Id. at 848–49. 
 150. Id. at 849. Such restrained “rate of growth for a period of unlimited duration, and not 
for the purpose of conducting studies or planning for future growth, is inherently and 
unavoidably detrimental to the public welfare, and therefore not a legitimate zoning purpose.” 
Id. But see Home Builders Ass’n of Cape Cod, Inc. v. Cape Cod Comm’n, 808 N.E.2d 315, 325 
(Mass. 2004) (upholding a permanent building cap because the town adopted the cap to protect 
a sole source aquifer).  
 151. Zuckerman, 813 N.E.2d at 850; see also Simon v. Town of Needham, 42 N.E.2d 516, 
519 (Mass. 1942) (describing how a restrictive bylaw encourages movement in nearby towns).  
 152. Zuckerman, 813 N.E.2d at 851. “Our holding . . . should make clear that bylaws 
restraining growth pass constitutional muster only where they specifically contain time 
limitations or where it is abundantly clear that they are temporary, because they are enacted to 
assist a particular planning process.” Id. at 849 n.16 (emphasis added).  
 153. 813 N.E.2d 843.  
 154. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
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use actions. Next, as American cities quickly bled into suburban and 
rural areas and towns increasingly used growth management to 
combat urbanization, Golden v. Planning Board of Ramapo155 
emerged. There, the Court of Appeals of New York condoned local 
permit requirements that fostered timed development.156 Both the 
Supreme Court in Euclid and New York’s high court in Ramapo 
hesitated to tread on legislative territory,157 recognizing that matters 
of land use are within the legislature’s prerogative.  
Later, in Construction Industry Ass’n of Sonoma County v. City of 
Petaluma,158 the Ninth Circuit applied Euclid to circumstances 
similar to those in Ramapo, with the addition of a growth quota. 
Again exhibiting deference for the legislature, the Ninth Circuit 
echoed courts before it by holding that the police power is 
expansive.159 In so doing, the Petaluma court compared the facts of 
Petaluma to those of Ybarra v. City of Los Altos Hills160 and Village 
of Belle Terre v. Boraas,161 in which courts upheld more restrictive 
growth controls. For nearly thirty years, Petaluma has guided courts 
in construing the police power broadly and in deciding growth 
management quota litigation in favor of local communities. 
Zuckerman alters this paradigm. 
The town of Hadley possessed an admirable purpose when it 
enacted its growth management scheme. Witnessing urban life 
encroaching on a calm, bucolic setting, the town acted to protect its 
rural nature, its distinguishing feature, by limiting not the use of land, 
but the time that use occurred.162 However, it did so in a way that was 
unreasoned, unguided and ultimately unconstitutional. 
 155. 285 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972). 
 156. Id. at 304. 
 157. See supra notes 48, 78 and accompanying text. 
 158. 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975). 
 159. Id. at 906. 
 160. 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974). 
 161. 416 U.S. 1 (1974). 
 162. As the Hadley court articulated: 
 Rate of development bylaws such as the one at issue here are restrictions not on how 
land ultimately may be used, but on when certain classes of property owners may use 
their land. Where classic zoning bylaws keep the pig out of the parlor, rate of 
development bylaws tell the farmer how many new pigs may be in the barnyard each 
year.  
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There are a number of intertwined policy considerations 
implicated by growth management disputes. Legislative deference is 
a theme running throughout the decisions in Euclid, Ramapo, 
Petaluma, Ybarra, Village of Belle Terre and Sturges. Each of these 
courts voiced reluctance to challenge legislative determinations that 
the zoning or growth management ordinances at issue were 
constitutional. Instead, each court interpreted the police power 
broadly so as to easily encompass temporary growth controls 
intended to ensure peaceful enjoyment for residents of suburban 
communities. In addition, the costs of urbanization bolstered each 
court’s deference to the legislature and its ultimate holding of 
constitutionality. In each of these cases, legislative deference, a 
feature of substantive due process review by federal courts, and the 
expenses of urban expansion outweighed any individual 
inconvenience. These factors motivated the courts to declare 
questionable growth management to be in the interest of the public.163  
A corollary to legislative deference is a court’s willingness to 
review the fit between the means and ends of a particular growth 
control. In line with the pre-Zuckerman courts’ preferences for 
judicial deference, each court also chose not to meticulously examine 
the relationship between the ordinance or zoning action and its 
intended goal. It is certainly possible that the Zuckerman court 
exhibited less deference for the legislature and more closely 
examined the means-ends relationship because the ordinance at issue, 
a permanent measure to stave off growth, was an egregious use of 
growth management. It is also possible that the Zuckerman court’s 
status as a state court influenced its decision to delve deeper into the 
propriety of the rationale behind Hadley’s rate of development 
amendment. Regardless of the motivation, the Zuckerman court 
ultimately privileged an inquiry into an individual’s property rights 
over an established trend of deference.164  
813 N.E.2d 843, 850 (Mass. 2004) (citation omitted).  
 163. “Interpretive flexibility allows for the evolution of constitutional guarantees to address 
new controversies in light of changing societal values and convictions.” GODSCHALK, supra 
note 28, at 163. For this reason, federal courts, with stronger precedent than state courts, shy 
away from declaring distant local acts unconstitutional. Id. 
 164. Analysts predicted this movement in land use litigation. Land use litigation has 
traveled a historical progression from judicial “faith in local autonomy,” characterized by 
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A further consideration implicated by growth management quotas 
generally, and that of Zuckerman specifically, is the importance of 
comprehensive plans in supporting local growth management. A 
feature distinguishing Zuckerman from the pre-Zuckerman line of 
cases is Hadley’s failure to take any measures other than its rate of 
development amendment to remedy insufficiencies created by urban 
growth. Petaluma enacted its plan for the express purpose of easing 
growing pains while the town executed its comprehensive plan; the 
town of Chilmark instituted its quota to conduct scientific analysis of 
the town’s water and sewage disposal. However, the town of Hadley 
repeatedly ignored recommendations to institute a comprehensive 
plan or other tools to plan for development.165  
Comprehensive plans often account for not only local, but also 
regional well-being. The Zuckerman court hinted that future courts 
might evaluate the regional impact of growth management quotas to 
determine whether they serve the general welfare.166 In Zuckerman, 
“strong presumptions of validity for local actions with no suspicion of motives,” to an emerging 
“sophisticated judicial review” marked by greater concentration between means and ends, “a 
clearer definition of neighbor’s rights,” and greater reliance on the requirement that zoning be 
carried out following a comprehensive plan. Id. at 197; see also Bd. of Supervisors v. Williams, 
216 S.E.2d 33 (Va. 1975) (measuring specific planning decisions against the plans and policies 
they are purported to serve). 
 165.  
 The chairman of the Hadley planning board testified at his deposition that the town 
“should” develop and implement a comprehensive land use plan, “should” increase 
minimum lot sizes in agricultural districts to 80,000 square feet, and “should” adopt a 
community open space bylaw. He admitted, however, that fifteen years after the 
adoption of the ROD amendment, none of these had been effectuated. 
Zuckerman, 813 N.E.2d at 847 n.9 (emphasis added); see also Beck v. Town of Raymond, 394 
A.2d 847, 852 (N.H. 1978) (holding that growth controls adopted by cities and towns “should 
be the product of careful study and should be reexamined constantly with a view toward 
relaxing or ending them”) (emphasis added). The town of Hadley’s disregard for the 
importance of timely improvements can be contrasted with other Massachusetts communities 
that enact growth management for defined lengths: five or, at most, ten years. Jonathan 
Saltzman, SJC Overturns Hadley Zoning Bylaw: Placed Strict Curb on Development, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Aug. 25, 2004, at B3 (quoting Joel B. Bard, attorney for the town of Hadley).  
 166. “[R]ate of development bylaws reallocate population growth from one town to 
another, and impose on other communities the increased burdens that one community seeks to 
avoid.” Zuckerman, 813 N.E.2d at 850. Further, “[d]espite the perceived benefits that enforced 
isolation may bring to a town facing a new wave of permanent home seekers, it does not serve 
the general welfare of the Commonwealth to permit one particular town to deflect that wave 
onto its neighbors.” Id. 
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Hadley’s rate of development amendment had the effect of pushing 
potential Hadley residents into neighboring communities, 
exacerbating the pressures of population growth for the entire 
region.167 However, an evaluation of regional well-being might 
actually justify growth management.168 This regional approach is a 
rising and controversial trend.169 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has clarified the law 
of growth management quotas at the state level. In Massachusetts, 
Zuckerman’s impact is substantial. Since 1980, when the Supreme 
Judicial Court held a temporary rate of development restriction valid 
in Sturges, as many as fifty municipalities enacted bylaws similar to 
that at issue in Sturges, which is nearly identical to the bylaw struck 
down in Zuckerman.170 Many of these bylaws may now be 
unconstitutional, or at least challengeable, under Zuckerman.171  
In the wake of Zuckerman  Massachusetts has a lens through 
which to examine growth management quotas. At one end of the 
spectrum is Sturges, dictating that a bylaw that contains specific time 
limitations or is clearly temporary and enacted in conjunction with a 
planning scheme will likely be held constitutional.172 At the other end 
is Zuckerman, instructing that permanent bylaws enacted without a 
comprehensive plan solely to maintain a town’s rural character will 
likely be held unconstitutional.173 Future courts are left to determine 
the circumstances falling between these poles. In addition, the 
 167. “Every time a community passes one of these rate-of-growth bylaws, it pulls up the 
drawbridges around that community and artificially forces neighboring communities to bear the 
brunt of the population explosion.” Saltzman, supra note 165, at B3 (quoting Diane C. 
Tillotson, attorney for Martha Zuckerman); see also John D. Landis, Do Growth Controls 
Work? A New Assessment, 58 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 489, 498 (1992) (offering a comparative 
evaluation of California cities with and without growth controls, and suggesting that “spillover” 
opportunities in neighboring communities allow housing prices in municipalities with growth 
controls to remain constant).  
 168. See, e.g., Home Builders Ass’n of Cape Cod, Inc. v. Cape Cod Comm’n, 808 N.E.2d 
315, 325 (Mass. 2004) (upholding a permanent building cap because of its necessity to protect a 
sole source aquifer, the integrity of which was of regional importance). 
 169. See, e.g.,  Katharine J. Jackson, The Need for Regional Management of Growth: 
Boulder, Colorado, as a Case Study, 37 URB. LAW. 316–20 (2005).  
 170. “Rate of Development” Bylaw, supra note 134, at 1. 
 171. Id. at 2. 
 172. Id.  
 173. Id.  
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Zuckerman decision is likely to affect decisions in other states, and 
may even inform future federal decisions.  
Future courts following Zuckerman should exercise less deference 
for the legislature, scrutinize the propriety of suspect quotas, insist on 
the enactment of comprehensive plans or other planning processes in 
conjunction with quotas, and analyze the regional impact of a quota 
system dictating rate of growth. In addition, local governments 
should respond to the Zuckerman decision. Local boards should not 
enact permanent, unreasoned growth controls, but should instead 
justify quota decisions and prescribe definite termination dates. These 
precautions will improve the local development process by forcing 
local governments to review the propriety of their own acts, and may 
ultimately alert interested parties prior to litigation.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Urban growth is inevitable. The American desire for property 
ownership is age-old and unrelenting. As residents of urban areas tire 
of the noise and commotion of city life, they often migrate to more 
rural communities. This movement, however, can increase pressure 
on suburban and rural towns to provide public services, and can even 
destroy local character. To forestall expansion, some communities 
have turned to growth management, a tool by which the legislature 
restricts expansion with ordinances targeting development. 
Litigation has arisen over the use of rate of development growth 
controls in the form of growth management quotas. Using the 
Supreme Court’s analysis in Euclid, federal and state courts alike 
have held temporary growth controls valid, paying special attention 
to the steps that each local community took to further comprehensive 
plans. Zuckerman changed this landscape.  
Massachusetts courts, other state courts, and even federal courts 
may glean wisdom from Zuckerman. After Zuckerman, courts should 
exhibit less deference for legislatures, insist that communities 
develop comprehensive plans in conjunction with temporary rate of 
development controls, and investigate the regional impact of growth 
management quotas. In addition, local governments should increase 
research and planning resources devoted to growth management 
programs. Further, communities should begin to document local and 
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regional findings to justify their growth management actions in the 
event of litigation. By virtue of devoting more resources to the 
analysis of growth management before enactment, local communities 
will be forced to evaluate the implications of growth management 
prior to litigation. Ideally, such analysis will prevent litigation 
entirely.  
It appears after Zuckerman that Sherwood Anderson’s hometown 
might be safe. “After the wagon containing the berry pickers had 
passed, he went across the field through the tall mustard weeds and 
climbing a rail fence peered anxiously along the road to the town.”174 
He saw a moving truck in the distance. Although urbanization may 
not be staved off permanently, it can be controlled when done so 
constitutionally. 
 174. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 8. 
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